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Abstract—Blockchain has attracted a broad range of interests
from start-ups, enterprises and governments to build next gen-
eration applications in a decentralized manner. Similar to cloud
platforms, a single blockchain-based system may need to serve
multiple tenants simultaneously. However, design of multi-tenant
blockchain-based systems is challenging to architects in terms
of data and performance isolation, as well as scalability. First,
tenants must not be able to read other tenants’ data and tenants
with potentially higher workload should not affect read/write
performance of other tenants. Second, multi-tenant blockchain-
based systems usually require both scalability for each individual
tenant and scalability with number of tenants. Therefore, in this
paper, we propose a scalable platform architecture for multi-
tenant blockchain-based systems to ensure data integrity while
maintaining data privacy and performance isolation. In the pro-
posed architecture, each tenant has an individual permissioned
blockchain to maintain their own data and smart contracts. All
tenant chains are anchored into a main chain, in a way that
minimizes cost and load overheads. The proposed architecture
has been implemented in a proof-of-concept prototype with
our industry partner, Laava ID Pty Ltd (Laava). We evaluate
our proposal in a three-fold way: fulfilment of the identified
requirements, qualitative comparison with design alternatives,
and quantitative analysis. The evaluation results show that the
proposed architecture can achieve data integrity, performance
isolation, data privacy, configuration flexibility, availability, cost
efficiency and scalability.
Index Terms—software architecture, blockchain, smart con-
tract, multi-tenant, Merkle tree
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is an emerging distributed ledger technology
which has attracted a broad range of interests from start-ups,
enterprises and governments [14] [19] to address lack-of-trust
issues in a decentralized manner. A large number of projects
have been conducted to explore how to use blockchain to re-
architect systems and to build new applications and business
models. Blockchain application areas are diverse, including
supply chain, IoT, physical or digital asset registries, digital
currency, payment, trade finance, and identity management.
Similar to cloud platforms, a single blockchain-based sys-
tem is often required to serve multiple tenants who reside
in the same system to maintain their data. For example, a
traceability system usually provides quality tracking services
to different product manufacturers and each manufacturer can
manage the tracking of their products individually.
However, design of multi-tenant blockchain-based systems
is challenging to architects in terms of data and performance
isolation, as well as scalability. First, tenants must not be
able to read other tenants’ data and tenants with potentially
higher workload should not affect read/write performance of
other tenants. Second, multi-tenant blockchain-based systems
usually require both scalability for each tenant and scalability
with number of tenants.
Therefore, in this paper, we design a scalable platform archi-
tecture for multi-tenant blockchain-based systems to achieve
integrity of each tenant’s data while ensuring data privacy
and performance isolation. In the proposed architecture, each
tenant has an individual permissioned blockchain to maintain
their data. We design a custom Merkle tree in which each leaf
node represents the root of each tenant’s individual blockchain
Merkle tree. We store the created custom Merkle tree on each
individual blockchain and place the root of the custom Merkle
tree at a pre-configured interval on a public blockchain through
an anchoring component. This architecture design allows
publicly verifiable integrity of permissioned blockchains at
any time via anchoring consensus state of each permissioned
blockchain at periodic intervals to a public blockchain. The
anchoring overhead and cost remains mostly static, regardless
of the number of tenants. The architecture can also be applied
to store information with different characteristics to improve
flexibility and reduce cost (e.g. a long-lived blockchain and a
short-lived blockchain).
We implement the proposed architecture in a proof-of-
concept prototype, as part of a collaborative project with
our industry partner Laava1. We adopt Ethereum [1] in our
implementation since it currently offers the most mature smart
contract support. In our three-pronged evaluation, we first
examine the architecture by checking the fulfilment of the
identified requirements for multi-tenant blockchain-based sys-
tems. Second, we provide a qualitative analysis by comparing
the proposed architecture with two architecture design altern-
atives. Third, we conduct a quantitative analysis by measuring
the throughput under a number of conditions. The results
show that the proposed architecture can achieve data integrity,
performance isolation, data privacy, configuration flexibility,
availability, cost efficiency and scalability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The next section discusses background and related work.
Section III introduces the requirements for multi-tenant
1https://www.laava.id (accessed on 27 Nov 2018)
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Figure 1. Ethereum block header and state merkle tree.
blockchain-based systems. Section IV presents the proposed
architecture. Section V discusses the prototypical implementa-
tion of the architecture in the context of Laava’s use case. Sec-
tion VI evaluates the proposed architecture before Section VII
concludes the paper and outlines the future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Background: Blockchain
A blockchain is a distributed append-only store of trans-
actions distributed across computational nodes and structured
as a linked list of blocks, each containing a set of trans-
actions [23]. Blockchain was introduced as the technology
behind Bitcoin [10]. Its concepts have been generalized to dis-
tributed ledger systems that verify and store any transactions
without coins or tokens [18], without relying on any central
trusted authority like traditional banking or payment systems.
Instead, all participants in the network can reach agreements
on the states of transactional data to achieve trust.
Merkle trees are an important part of blockchain, supporting
fundamental blockchain functionality and enabling efficient
and secure verification of large data structures. Merkle trees
have a hash-based structure that can ensure data integrity in
a trivial way: each node (except leaves) in the tree contains
the hash of its child node values; if nothing changed, the root
will be the same; otherwise only the hashes on the path from
the root to the changed leaves are changed. The Merkle tree
used in the Ethereum blockchain platform is called Merkle
Patricia tree [1]. There are three different Merkle Patricia
tree structures in Ethereum, as illustrated in Fig. 1: state tree,
transaction tree and receipt tree. Every block header contains
the roots of those three trees. The global state tree contains
a key-value pair for every account in the Ethereum network
and is updated by every transaction. The key is the account
address while the value is an encoding of details including
nonce, balance, storageRoot and codeHash. The root of state
tree is cryptographically dependent on all state tree data and
can be used as a unique and secure identifier for the state tree.
A smart contract is a user-defined program that is deployed
and executed on a blockchain system [12], [23], which can
express triggers, conditions and business logic [21] to enable
complex programmable transactions. Smart contracts can be
deployed and invoked through transactions, and are executed
across the blockchain network by all connected nodes. The
signature of the transaction sender authorizes the data payload
of a transaction to create or execute a smart contract. Trust
in the correct execution of smart contracts extends directly
from regular transactions, since (i) they are deployed as data
in a transaction and thus immutable; (ii) all their inputs are
through transactions and the current state; (iii) their code is
deterministic; and (iv) the results of transactions are captured
in the state and receipt trees, which are part of the consensus.
When using a blockchain, there are different types of
deployments, including public blockchain, consortium block-
chain or private blockchain. Public blockchains, which can
be accessed by anyone on the Internet (“permission-less”),
have high information transparency and auditability, but sac-
rifice performance and a cost/incentive model. A consortium
blockchain is typically used across multiple organisations and
the rights to read/write on the blockchain may be restricted
to specific participants. In a private blockchain network, write
permissions are often kept within one organisation, although
this may include multiple divisions of a single organisation.
Private blockchains are the most flexible for configuration
because the network is governed and hosted by a single
organisation. A blockchain may be permissioned in requiring
that one or more authorities act as a gate for participation.
This may include permission to join the network and read
information from the blockchain, to initiate transactions, or
to create blocks. Permissions can be stored either on-chain or
off-chain. There are often tradeoffs between permissioned and
permission-less blockchains including transaction processing
rate, cost, censorship-resistance, reversibility, finality and flex-
ibility in changing and optimising the network rules.
B. Related Work
There are a number of projects which have been conducted
to address blockchain limitations including scalability, privacy
and cost. Quorum2 addresses specific challenges to blockchain
technology adoption in the financial industry, which supports
both public and private smart contracts to enable data privacy.
Plasma [13] is designed to be scalable to a large amount of
state updates by providing incentivised and enforced execution
of smart contracts via transaction fees. The Dfinity block-
chain [4] provides a scalable consensus mechanism which
can scale through continuous quorum selections driven by
a random beacon. In Dfinity, the interblock time (interval
between two blocks) takes a few seconds and a transaction
is committed after only two confirmation blocks. Komodo3
includes a delayed Proof of Work consensus mechanism to
ensure security while avoiding direct competition. Stellar4
provides a distributed payment infrastructure, which takes 2-
5 seconds to reach consensus. EOS5 is designed to enable
2https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/Quorum
3https://komodoplatform.com/
4https://www.stellar.org/
5https://eos.io/
vertical and horizontal scaling of decentralized applications
by providing an operating system-like construct, which can
handle to thousands of transactions per second without fees.
Many efforts have considered the area of multiple block-
chains and sides chains. Kan et al. [5] propose an archi-
tecture for reliably exchanging information across multiple
blockchains. A connection model is designed for routing man-
agement in multiple blockchains, which can provide atomicity
and consistency for transactions across blockchains and allows
increasing throughput. Cash and Bassiouni [2] propose a two-
tier blockchain architecture that utilizes a permission-less tier
for decentralization and security, and a centralized tier that
focuses on data control and restrictions. In the architecture,
tier one allows any node to read from and write to the
blockchain, while tier two only allows restricted users to
process read and write operations. The Loom Network6 is
a scaling solution for Ethereum, which provides a network
of Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) sidechains allowing for
highly-scalable decentralized applications while still being
backed by the security of Ethereum.
Supply chain and registries are two promising areas for
applications of blockchain. Most of the existing work on
supply chain [6], [8], [9], [15], [22] focuses on designing
blockchain-based systems to achieve item traceability by lever-
aging the fundamental properties of blockchain. Lu and Xu [9]
shared the experience of building originChain, an adaptable
blockchain-based system which provides transparent tamper-
proof traceability data and automates regulatory-compliance
checking. Tian [15] combines Radio-Frequency Identification
(RFID) and blockchain technology to build a food supply
chain traceability system, which covers the whole traceability
management process for quality and safety of food. Kim and
Laskowski [6] analyse a traceability ontology and translate
some of its representations to smart contracts that execute a
provenance trace and enforce traceability constraints.
Building registries on a blockchain can guarantee data
integrity, availability, transparency and immutability, which are
key requirements for registries [3]. There are registries being
built on blockchain in ad-hoc ways, for example, Namecoin7,
which is a domain name registry that shares the same network
with Bitcoin8, and Abscribe9, which is an artwork registry that
allows artists to register and manage the ownership of their
digital artwork. However, building a registry on blockchain is
non-trivial due to the steep learning curve of the technology.
Regis10 is a contract generator on Ethereum11 blockchain, but
only provides very basic operations. A registry generator for
blockchain was introduced in a demo paper [17].
However, we are not aware of any work addressing the
challenges of commercial multi-tenant systems on blockchain,
such as performance isolation and data privacy.
6https://loomx.io/
7https://namecoin.org/
8https://bitcoin.org/
9https://www.ascribe.io/
10https://regis.nu/
11https://www.ethereum.org/
III. REQUIREMENTS
We gathered application-agnostic functional and non-
functional requirements of multi-tenant blockchain-based sys-
tems, which are described below. We followed standard re-
quirements elicitation methodologies [7] in our work with
Laava for their specific requirements. Subsequently we ab-
stracted and filtered these system-specific requirements to
derive a list for the more general class of multi-tenant systems.
Some of the requirements here might differ from the needs
of other systems, while others might need to be refined.
Therefore, the list can be viewed as assumptions and drivers
for the architecture we discuss in the rest of the paper. If
applied to another system, the changes to the requirements
may need to be reflected in an adaptation of the architecture.
A. Functional Requirements
FR1 – Writing data on blockchain restricted to selected
clients: The platform shall have the ability to write data on
blockchain, restricted, e.g., to the platform owner.
FR2 – Writing batches of data on blockchain: The platform
shall have the ability to write batches of data with low cost
and overhead.
FR3 – Viewing the entire history: The platform shall have
ability to read the entire data history, i.e., all historical events
and data values over time.
FR4 – Tracking authenticity of data: end users need to be able
to see and validate the identity of clients that wrote data to
the system.
FR5 – Providing external auditing/verification for independent
agencies: independent agencies need to be able to access data
for auditing for each individual tenant.
FR6 – Providing a multi-tenant platform: the platform sup-
ports multiple tenants to serve their end users, where different
tenants can have different business needs.
B. Non-Functional Requirements
NFR1 – Data integrity of on-chain data must be ensured.
NFR2 – Scalability:
• Scalability within each tenant. For example, a tenant
might store large amounts of data within a period of time.
• Scalability in the number of tenants.
NFR3 – Data Privacy: in general, tenants must not be able
to read other tenants’ data (e.g., how many unique item IDs
were created, scan event counts, timing, or locations).
NFR4 – Performance Isolation: tenants with potentially higher
workload (e.g., commodity goods with millions of events
daily) should not affect read/write performance for other
tenants.
NFR5 – Availability: the blockchain infrastructure must be
available, in terms of responsiveness to read/write operations.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we propose a platform architecture which
can meet the above requirements of multi-tenant blockchain-
based systems.
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Figure 2. Platform Architecture for multi-tenant blockchain-based systems.
A. Overall Architecture
Fig. 2 illustrates the platform architecture we propose for
multi-tenant blockchain-based systems. Each tenant has an
individual permissioned blockchain to maintain their informa-
tion. The platform owner hosts all admin nodes for producing
blocks while the tenants/auditors host read-only nodes, which
can be enforced through the blockchain configuration. The
platform owner has access to all the tenants’ on-chain data,
and provides APIs for writing to tenants’ chains.
An end user, e.g., a client of a tenant, sends write requests
through the routing component, which forwards them to re-
spective tenant’s blockchain to process. The load balancer
distributes the workload to the trigger components for different
admin nodes of the same tenant. The functionality provided
by the trigger includes writing data to the blockchain and
communicating with the anchoring component. The user sends
read requests to the read-only node through a public API.
The proposed architecture allows publicly verifiable integ-
rity of private blockchains at particular times via anchoring
the consensus state of each private chain at periodic intervals
to the public blockchain. The anchoring component connects
to a node in the public blockchain network, and one node for
each tenant’s blockchain to be anchored. We design a Merkle
tree T , as shown in the top right corner of Fig. 2, in which
each leaf node represents the root of each tenant blockchain
Merkle tree RTenantX . We store the newly created Merkle tree
T on each individual blockchain and place its root RootT on
a public blockchain through the anchoring component. The
architecture can also be applied to store information with
different characteristics to improve flexibility and reduce cost
(e.g. a long-lived blockchain and a short lived blockchain).
There are two smart contracts in this architecture: a smart
contract in each tenant’s permissioned blockchain and a smart
contract in the public blockchain. The smart contract in each
tenant’s blockchain is pre-deployed and included as part of
genesis block. The Merkle tree data structure for T is stored
in this smart contact, while its root RootT is placed in the
smart contract in the public blockchain. The Merkle tree
implementation uses Ethereum’s Merkle-Patricia tree library.
This design assumes that the platform owner can be relied
on by tenants in handling the anchoring process, which leads
to the design decision that only the platform owner is hosting
the anchoring component. Tenants can continuously monitor
that the platform owner is performing the anchoring process
in a correct manner, as described below. In other words, the
trust in the platform owner only extends to it performing the
anchoring, no trust in its correctness is required.
B. Anchoring protocol
The anchoring scheduler is configured as agreed between
the platform owner and tenants (e.g. every 10 minutes). The
Query the latest 
anchored root on 
public blockchain
Verify the root against 
the tree in the 
anchoring component
For each tenant chain
Query the 
root on the 
latest block
X
New chain
Add the root 
of chain as a 
new node
Update the 
Merkle tree of 
roots
Write the root of the 
updated Merkle tree 
to public blockchain
Write the updated 
Merkle tree to each 
tenant Chain
No update
III
III
X
Figure 3. The anchoring protocol. (Notation: BPMN)
identity of each blockchain is established using the hash of
genesis block. Fig. 3 describes the way the anchoring protocol
works at anchoring time, in the BPMN notation [11].
The protocol starts with querying the latest anchored Merkle
root stored on the public blockchain and verifying the Merkle
root against the tree maintained in the anchoring component
to make sure the anchoring component is up to date. For each
tenant’s permissioned blockchain registered with the anchoring
component, there is a subprocess in Fig. 3; all subprocesses
are executed in parallel (see marker “III” at the bottom). In
such a subprocess, say for tenant X , the protocol queries the
blockchain Merkle roots on the latest block. If the chain is in
the Merkle tree of roots, the value for RTenantX is updated.
If not, e.g. X is a new tenant, the RTenantX is added as a
new node of the Merkle tree of roots. The tenant blockchain
node might not be available, and the request times out. In that
case, this tenant chain’s root is not updated.
After all tenant blockchain roots are processed, the protocol
writes the Merkle root RootT of the updated Merkle tree of
roots to public blockchain along with the previous root, and
stores the content of the updated tree to the smart contract
pre-deployed on each tenant’s blockchain.
The transaction that anchors the Merkle root to public
blockchain might take time to be included and committed,
which may be longer than the anchor interval. Thus, the
anchoring scheduler is using a simple lock-based mechanism.
Whenever a new anchoring round starts, it claims the lock.
New anchoring rounds are always scheduled according to the
interval. When the next round is scheduled, it will first check
whether the lock is available. If the lock is not available, then
that round will be skipped.
C. Auditing process
The integrity auditing process is as follows.
• The auditor needs to run a node of a tenant’s blockchain
(say, Tenant X) as the auditor node.
• The auditor needs to read the latest anchoring point on
public blockchain and obtain the Merkle root Root
′
T and
the Merkle root of the corresponding block of this tenant’s
blockchain (i.e. R
′
TenantX ).
• The auditor compares R
′
TenantX with the root stored in
the Merkle tree of roots for Tenant X’s blockchain at
anchoring time (i.e. RTenantX ).
• The auditor compares Root
′
T with the value of the Merkle
tree stored in the tenant’s blockchain (i.e. RootT ).
By performing the auditing process, the auditor can con-
tinuously monitor the data written to each tenant chain and the
correctness of anchoring performed by the platform owner.
V. USE CASE AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Use Case
Product counterfeiting and fraud are costly for the industry
and potentially dangerous for customers, especially if medicine
and food products are affected. These problems are wide-
spread across many industries and supply chain processes.
Laava is a third-party item tracking service provider which
provides a novel type of unique ID for individual item tracking
with various interesting features. The unique IDs are designed
in a way that makes counterfeiting harder, and has numerous
advantages over barcode and QR codes. Regarding system
requirements, hundreds of product manufacturers may become
tenants and use the system to manage their products’ traceab-
ility information, and millions of product consumers may use
it to access the information. Laava clients will create unique
IDs on a blockchain at the point of packaging or production.
The products with individual unique IDs on them will flow
through the supply chain and pass through multiple points of
scanning until they reach consumers.
The authors from Data61, CSIRO, developed a prototype
for the Laava use case in a collaborative project with product
managers, architects, and developers from Laava. In particular,
Blockchain ID Oracle Interface
Serialized Trie Store
Public Anchor
+ anchorPoints(anchorTimestamp: uint): bytes32
+ createAnchorPoint(anchorTimestamp: uint, trieRoot: bytes32)
+ getLatestAnchorPoint(): (anchorTimestamp: uint, trieRoot: bytes32)
+ getAllAnchorTimestamps(): uint[]
- getLatestAnchorTimestamp(): uint
anchorPoints: mapping (uint => bytes32)
+ trieAtAnchorTimestamp(timestamp: uint): bytes
+ storeTrie(anchorTimestamp: uint, serialisedTrieContent: bytes)
trieAtAnchorTimestamp: mapping (uint => bytes)
+ getBlockchainId(): bytes32
Figure 4. On-chain data structure for anchoring
the project seeks to allow any individual physical or digital
thing to be authenticated easily and securely, using blockchain.
B. Implementation
We used a model-driven engineering tool called Lorikeet
[16], which can automatically produce smart contracts from
business process models and registry data schema, to imple-
ment the proposed architecture design. The smart contracts are
written in Solidity, compiled with Solidity compiler version
0.4.24. We used Truffle framework12 to compile and test
smart contracts. The trigger and anchoring components are
written in TypeScript with Node.js version 10, implementing
the REST API using express.js server. Blockchain miners order
pending transactions first by account nonce, then gas price for
inclusion to new blocks. Thus, in each tenant’s permissioned
blockchain trigger, we used a different Ethereum account and
provided higher gas price for anchor-specific transactions.
This is to make sure the anchor transactions are not delayed
(having separate nonce) and have highest priority to be in-
cluded in each tenant’s chain. Fig. 4 shows the on-chain data
structure designed for anchoring in multi-tenant blockchain-
based systems, which includes BlockchainIDOracleInterface,
SerializedTrieStore, and PublicAnchor.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed architecture design
in terms of requirements fulfilment, qualitative analysis and
quantitative analysis. For requirements fulfilment, we ex-
amined the implemented proof-of-concept using the proposed
architecture against the functional and non-functional require-
ments identified in Section III.
12https://truffleframework.com
A. Functional Requirements Fulfilment
FR1 - Writing data on blockchain restricted to selected
clients The tenants are able to register unique ID, meta data,
and scan events on-chain via the API provided by Laava.
FR2 - Write batches of data on blockchain We implemented
a function in the unique ID registry contract for creating an
array of unique IDs, so that a batch of multiple unique IDs
can be registered via one function call, i.e. one blockchain
transaction.
FR3 - View the entire history The tenants are able to read
all historical events and data values over time via the API
provided by Laava.
FR4 - Track authenticity of data Once a consumer scans
a unique ID, they are able to validate the identity of the
manufacturer who registered the unique ID.
FR5 - Independent agencies to provide external audit-
ing/verification The independent agencies are able to access
data for auditing for each individual tenant via the read-only
nodes hosted by the independent agencies.
FR6 – Multi-tenant platform The platform supports multiple
tenants to have individual permissioned blockchain to serve
their end users, where different tenants can have different
business needs.
B. Non-Functional Requirements Fulfilment
NFR1 - Data integrity Data integrity is achieved via anchor-
ing to public blockchain.
NFR2 - Scalability The operations of registering unique
ID and scan event etc. are on permissioned blockchain so
there is no transactional cost involved (compared to public
blockchain). The cost mainly involves maintaining the infra-
structure for permissioned blockchains to ensure availability,
which shows good scalability within one tenant.
The cost for anchoring to public blockchain is fixed since
only the combined Merkle root of all tenant chains’ Merkle
roots are written to public blockchain at predetermined inter-
vals. Thus, the proposed design is scalable in respect to the
number of tenant chains.
NFR3 - Data Privacy Data privacy is enabled since each
tenant has an individual tenant chain which has restrict per-
missions to join and runs on separate networks (i.e. VPCs).
NFR4 - Performance Isolation Tenants have own permis-
sioned public blockchains. Thus, transactions on one chain
would not affect others.
NFR5 - Availability Each tenant chain maintains sufficient
replication to ensure availability for each tenant’s chain.
C. Qualitative Analysis
In this section, we evaluate three design alternatives against
the identified non-functional requirements listed in Section III.
1) Design Alternatives: We evaluate the architecture design
by comparing three design alternatives: architecture using
public blockchain (Design Alternative 1 illustrated in Fig. 5),
architecture using global chain anchoring to public blockchain
(Design Alternative 2 shown in Fig. 6), architecture using
multiple blockchains anchoring to public blockchain (Design
Alternative 3 – the proposed architecture design discussed in
Section IV).
As shown in Fig. 5, in Design Alternative 1, all the
information is stored on public blockchain. The public block-
chain provides a neutral data store to maintain unique ID
information. Anyone on the Internet can access the unique
ID information stored on the public blockchain using the de-
ployed smart contracts. The platform owner’s existing backend
communicates with the unique ID registry smart contracts
deployed on blockchain via the blockchain trigger. The unique
ID registry smart contracts are deployed on the public block-
chain network. The blockchain trigger and local blockchain
node are hosted on one virtual machine (VM). The platform
owner’s existing backend interacts with the blockchain trigger
via REST API. In the blockchain trigger, there are two
layers: blockchain communication layer and business logic
layer. Blockchain communication layer consists of three com-
ponents, including sending blockchain transactions, querying
smart contract states, and listening to transaction progress
and smart contract events. Sending blockchain transactions
processes write operations while querying smart contract states
focuses on read operations. Blockchain trigger obtains status of
transactions and receives smart contract events via the listening
to transaction progress and smart contract events component.
The business logic layer comprises different business logic for
each REST API, which is processed through the blockchain
communication layer.
The Design Alternative 2 is illustrated in Fig. 6. Similar
to Design Alternative 3, the anchoring schedule is time-based
(e.g. every 10 mins), which is configured and agreed between
the platform owner and tenants. The anchoring component
stores the Merkle root of global blockchain (RootGlobalChain)
to the public blockchain we are anchoring to, together with the
block number and block hash of global blockchain at anchor-
ing time. To audit the data integrity of global blockchain, the
auditor runs a node of the global blockchain and read latest
anchor point on public blockchain. Then the auditor compares
RootGlobalChain at anchoring time with the information stored
on public blockchain.
2) Data Integrity: Data integrity is achievable by using all
the three design alternatives. In all the three design altern-
atives, creating a unique ID registry entry is done by Laava
in the current implementation. In Design Alternative 1, all
the tenants as blockchain network participants hold a local
copy of the blockchain, through which they can access the
unique ID registry on blockchain. In Design Alternative 2 and
Design Alternative 3, data integrity is guaranteed via anchoring
to public blockchain. Design Alternative 2 stores the Merkle
root of the global blockchain to the public blockchain while
Design Alternative 3 keeps the root of the Merkle roots of
each tenant’s blockchain on the public blockchain.
3) Cost: Both Design Alternative 2 and Design Alternative
3 are designed in a way that anchors to public blockchain.
The cost for anchoring to public blockchain is fixed as only
Merkle root of global blockchain (Design Alternative 2) or the
combined Merkle root of all tenant blockchain’s Merkle roots
(Design Alternative 3) are written to public blockchain at pre-
determined interval. Regarding infrastructure cost, platform
owners only needs to host one node for global blockchain
in Design Alternative 2, while the platform owner must host
at least one node for each individual tenant’s blockchain
in Design Alternative 3. To maintain availability, potentially
higher cost is needed with the increased number of tenants.
4) Data Privacy: Tenants are required to read their own
product data but not for competitors data. Data is encrypted
before storing to public blockchain in Design Alternative 1
and to global blockchain in Design Alternative 2. Design
Alternative 3 restricts the ability to join individual tenants’
blockchain as each has different genesis block and chain
ID. Also, in Design Alternative 3, nodes from each tenant’s
blockchain run on separate virtual private clouds (VPCs).
5) Performance Isolation: In Design Alternative 1 and
Design Alternative 2, tenants with higher transactional volume
and throughput might affect performance for lower-throughput
tenants since all the data are written through one blockchain
trigger. In Design Alternative 3, transactions on one chain
would not affect others since tenants have own permissioned
blockchains and each blockchain has its own trigger for
writing data to the corresponding blockchain.
6) Availability: Design Alternative 1 can achieve availabil-
ity since it uses public blockchain. Both Design Alternative 2
and Design Alternative 3 can increase availability by adding
more full nodes and block producers. Infrastructure cost and
maintenance overhead may increase with number of tenants.
Design Alternative 1 needs overall less number of replication
nodes as all tenants use one global blockchain.
7) Configuration Flexibility: Both Design Alternative 2 and
Design Alternative 3 can be independent of particular block-
chain forms. Different blockchains with different consensus
algorithms can be used for permissioned blockchain. Also,
both design can anchor to different public blockchains which
do not necessarily need to support smart contracts.
In Design Alternative 2, all tenants need to agree on
using the same blockchain platform, consensus algorithm and
configuration while Design Alternative 3 has flexibility to
choose different blockchain platforms (e.g. can use Hyper-
ledger Fabric for a particular tenant and use Ethereum for
others), consensus algorithms and blockchain configurations
(e.g. inter-block time) for each tenant. Only anchoring protocol
need to be agreed by all tenants.
D. Quantitative Analysis – Performance and Scalability
There are two objectives for the quantitative analysis. The
first objective is to measure the unique ID creation throughput
since the unique ID creation is one of the most important
functional requirements of the use case. The second objective
is to evaluate the anchoring process, since anchoring perform-
ance is critical for the feasibility of the overall architecture
design. In particular, the anchoring protocol needs to operate
regardless of the application load on the tenant chains.
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Figure 5. Design alternative 1 of multi-tenant blockchain-based systems.
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Figure 6. Design alternative 2 of multi-tenant blockchain-based systems.
1) Experiment design: Fig. 7 shows the experiment deploy-
ment architecture for measuring the performance and scalab-
ility of the prototype implementing the proposed architecture.
Components in the experiment design were deployed as
Docker containers on AWS13 EC2 virtual machines. We de-
ployed the anchoring component on a dedicated m5.xlarge
EC2 instance (4 vCPUs, 16 GB RAM, 20GB EBS disk), which
communicates with all tenant chain testbeds. Each tenant chain
testbed used (i) 4 m5.xlarge EC2 instances for blockchain
nodes, triggers, and other components; (ii) an Application
Load Balancer (AWS ALB); and (iii) one m5.2xlarge instance
(8 vCPUs and 32 GB RAM) for the JMeter load generator.
The permissioned tenant chain uses the Ethereum client Par-
ity and its Proof-of-Authority (PoA) implementation14, and has
3 authorities (i.e. block producing nodes) which are connected
to a trigger each. There is also one read-only node connected
to both the permissioned chain and the transaction profiler.
The block-producing nodes use different authority accounts.
Blocks are only produced when there are pending transactions.
The anchoring component is connected to a simulated public
blockchain node with an inter-block time of 15 seconds, which
is approximately the median for public Ethereum15.
13https://aws.amazon.com/
14https://wiki.parity.io/Proof-of-Authority-Chains
15https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/07/11/toward-a-12-second-block-time/
The load generation throughput is produced via JMeter,
which requests the creation of a high amount of new unique
IDs by calling the respective API. It is configured to 20
creations per batch (API call & blockchain transaction). The
test duration is 1 hour. The block gas limit in the tenant chain
is set to 80M gas and the inter-block time is configured to 5
second (the minimum recommended for Parity PoA16). Each
batch transaction consumes 1.05 million gas. Therefore, at
most 76 transactions fit into a block, limiting the theoretical
maximum throughput to 15.2 transactions per second (tps) –
corresponding to 304 unique ID creations per second. We run
four different tests to measure the transaction sending and
inclusion throughput over time with different loads:
Test 1: normal load scenario (<15tps), one tenant chain.
Test 2: boundary load scenario (starting at ≈18tps), one
tenant chain.
Test 3: overload scenario (≈18-25tps), one tenant chain,
i.e., the incoming throughput is higher than the theoretical
throughput limit of the blockchain.
Test 4: an overload scenario with three tenant chains (≈18-
25tps on each chain), i.e., Test 3 on three tenant chains in
parallel. With this test we investigate the performance isolation
between tenant chains as well as the anchoring protocol.
16https://github.com/paritytech/parity-ethereum/issues/9586
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Figure 7. Deployment architecture for quantitative analysis experiments.
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Figure 8. Throughput for Test 1, normal load scenario (<15tps).
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Figure 9. Throughput for Test 2, boundary load scenario (starting at ≈18tps).
The actual blockchain transaction inclusion throughput is
collected in the “Unique ID throughput profiler”. API call
latency and success/failure rates are measured by JMeter and
the API callback server. VM and container resource utilization
data are monitored via AWS CloudWatch. The anchoring per-
formance is measured based on the latency of the transactions
writing the Trie of roots content to the tenant chain.
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Figure 10. Throughput for Test 3, overload scenario (≈18-25tps).
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Figure 11. Throughput for Test 4, overload scenario (≈18-25tps).
2) Results: Figures 8-11 show the throughput measurement
results for Tests 1-4 respectively. The x-axis represents the
time elapsed since the start of the experiment (in minutes),
where load is generated from minute 0 to 59. The y-axis
represents the average throughput (tps).
Almost all the transactions are successfully sent and in-
cluded into the blockchain without errors. In Tests 1, 2
and 4, no errors occurred. In Test 3, 65,506 transactions
were sent and 3 errors occurred, which is reasonable under
overload conditions. Also, in Test 3 and 4, the transactions
above the maximum capacity of the blockchain network were
properly queued and eventually included after the generated
load finished at the 59-minute mark. Thus, we find that the im-
plemented prototype can register unique IDs successfully and
efficiently, which meets the first objective of the experiment.
We observed a degradation in performance over the duration
of the first 2 tests, and in the beginning of Test 3 and 4. This
may be caused by an interplay of the load generator, callback
server, and overhead in the trigger implementation, which
continuously monitors the transaction status after submitting
it to Parity. What can clearly be seen from Test 3 and 4 is
that it does not stem from the blockchain, since the inclusion
throughput reaches the maximum in minute 1 and (except
for a few block-minute-shifts, e.g. around minute 40 in Test
3) stays there until the backlog has been cleared. We also
observed from Test 4 that the performance is not impacted by
the increased number of tenant chains.
The second objective concerns the performance of anchor-
ing protocol. Here we measure the total time from start to end
of each round (cf. Fig. 3). For all four tests, we measured
total times between 9 and 22 seconds per round. Recall
from Section V, that we prioritize anchoring transactions by
specifying a higher gas price (fee). This strategy worked: the
anchoring times are not affected by the load of the tenant
chain, even in Test 3 where it is under heavy load.
Depending on the public blockchain used for anchoring, the
total anchoring time can be expected to be dominated by the
commit time for the transaction to the public chain. Typical
commit times are approx. 2-5 minutes for Ethereum, and about
50-100 minutes for Bitcoin [20].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a platform architecture for multi-tenant
blockchain systems. In the design, each tenant is given an
individual blockchain, and all tenant chains are anchored to a
public blockchain periodically. The anchoring uses a combined
root of all tenant chains, thus achieving data integrity, low cost,
and performance and data isolation. The proposed architecture
has been implemented in a prototype with our industry partner,
Laava. We evaluate the solution in a three-pronged fashion: by
examining requirement fulfilment, by quantitative comparison
with two design alternatives, and by quantitative analysis using
the prototype. The system achieves all objectives.
Although we focused on multi-tenant blockchain-based
systems, the proposed architecture can be applied to many
situations requiring multiple blockchains. Examples include a
long-lived and a short-lived blockchain for long and short-
running business needs, or a separate blockchain per year.
In future work, we plan to explore the above-mentioned
flexible use of anchored chains, as well as the use of other
technology platforms – both for tenant chains and public
chains – with a single anchoring component.
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